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NOTES
PRESUMED GUILTY: TRIAL BY THE MEDIA
THE SUPREME COURT'S REFUSAL
TO PROTECT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
IN HIGH PUBLICITY CASES

"[T]oday my rights are violated, and tomorrow yours., 1
Innocent until proven guilty. These four words not only
preserve the rights of a defendant in a criminal trial, but they
represent the ideals of the American legal system. The value of these
four words was seriously eroded with the Supreme Court's recent
ruling in Mu'Min v. Virginia.2 The decision gravely jeopardizes a
defendant's presumption of innocence, especially in highly publicized
cases.
In ruling that a trial court is not required to ask prospective
jurors the content of the publicity they have been exposed to prior to
trial,' criminal defendants in high publicity cases will now be faced
with an additional hurdle to overcome. Jury selection can now be a
mere formality, as a trial court can refuse a defendant's request to
inquire of potential jurors exactly what they have already heard about
the defendant, even if there has been an abundance of prejudicial
pretrial press against the accused.' The decision sends an open
invitation to trial courts across the nation to readily accept a
prospective juror's assurances of impartiality, without questioning the
juror as to the content of the publicity to which the juror has been
exposed.'

' Letter from Dawud Majid Mu'Min to William Kastin, Editor in Chief, New York
Law School Journalof Human Rights 3 (Feb. 19, 1992) (on file with the New York Law
School Journalof Human Rights).
2i
S. Ct. 1899 (1991).

Id. at 1905.
4 Id.

at 1907-08.

IId. at 1915 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
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In ruling that a prospective juror's claim of impartiality is
constitutionally sufficient, the Supreme Court has opened the door to
permit headlines and accusations, never presented at trial as evidence,
to taint a juror's mind in deliberating an accused's innocence or
guilt." If a trial judge follows the minimum standard approved by
the Supreme Court in Mu'Mn, no safeguard exists that allows a
defendant to question a juror's ability to claim impartiality. 7 Instead
of a trialby impartial jurors, the possibility now exists that a biased
juror will be seated after already having found the defendant guilty
without hearing any of the evidence. Trial by the media, instead of
trial by an impartial jury, will inevitably result because of the
Supreme Court's dangerous step backwards. Surely, this is not what
the authors of the Constitution anticipated or desired.'
This Note will first examine the Constitutional requirement of
seating an impartial jury. The increase of pretrial publicity will then
be discussed, followed by an examination of various aspects involved
in voir dire. The following sections will examine the requirements
of impartiality and the trial court's historical role in voir dire. The
Note will then address a juror's self-assessment of impartiality. The
recent case Mu 'Mn v. Virginia9 will then be addressed, followed by
a critique of the decision. Finally, other jurisdictional standards
regarding voir dire will be reviewed.

Id. at 1905.
Id. at 1915 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
s See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
stated:

In Duncan, the Supreme Court

Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience
that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges
brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the
voice of higher authority. The framers of the constitutions strove to
create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection
against arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the right to be
tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.
Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
9 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
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L An Impartial Jury is Guaranteed by the Constitution
A defendant's right to an impartial jury has long been
recognized in the American criminal justice system.' ° The right to an
impartial jury is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment, 1 made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 and by
principles of due process."
An impartial jury is a necessary
requirement in guaranteeing a fair criminal trial. 4 Among other
criteria, this includes a jury substantially free from the prejudicial
effects of inflammatory pretrial publicity. 5 To meet the required
constitutional standard, a juror must base his or her verdict solely on
the evidence presented at trial.16 A biased juror cannot judge because
he has already prejudged. 7 Therefore, all of a juror's preconceptions
10See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878) ("The theory of the law
is that a juror who has formed an opinion cannot be impartial.").
" The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the. right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed
*." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Fourteenth Amendment states
"[n]o state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law.

. .

."

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

"3Turnerv. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 n.9 (1985) (citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S.
589, 595 n.6 (1976)).
14Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
" Id. at 722-23.

16Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1912 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Over eighty years ago the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted:
There can be no justice in a trial by jurors inflamed by passion,
warped by prejudice, awed by violence, menaced by the virulence of
public opinion or manifestly biased by any influences operating
either openly or insidiously to such an extent as to poison the
judgment and prevent the freedom of fair action. Justice cannot be
assured in a trial where other considerations enter the minds of those
who are to decide than the single desire to ascertain and declare the
truth according to the law and evidence.
Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 511 n.12 (1971) (quoting Crocker v. Justices of the
Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 178-79 (1911)).
'7 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 43 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
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relating to the case must be set aside."8 This requirement guarantees
the defendant a fair trial by a group of impartial jurors.1 9
The explosion of communications in the electronic age
naturally diminishes the possibility of selecting a panel of impartial
jurors in a highly publicized case. As early as the 1960s, the
Supreme Court noted that unfair and prejudicial news reports had

become increasingly prevalent.2"

In the recent trial of General

Manuel Antonio Noriega, defense attorneys faced a formidable task
in finding a panel of twelve jurors who had not already formed an
opinion based on extensive pretrial publicity.2" The same problem

was encountered by defense counsels in the recent rape trials of
William Kennedy Smith22 and Mike Tyson23 and the mass murder
trial of Jeffrey Dahmer.' 4 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
IS Mu'Min,

111 S.Ct. at 1912 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

19Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).

0 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
2) Larry Rohter, For Noriega Jury: Many Are Called, None Chosen, N.Y. TIMES,

Sept. 13, 1991, at A23. Prospective jurors in the Noriega trial were mailed a 27-page
form with 84 questions concerning, among other things, biographical information,
current affairs, and which newspapers they read. Id.
' Carolyn Pesce, Judge Delays Seating Smith Jury, USA TODAY, Nov. 22, 1991,
at 3A. In the William Kennedy Smith trial, the first round of juror questioning focused
solely on attitudes about pretrial publicity and the Kennedys. Smith's Attorney Says TV
Makes Jury Panel Wary, SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 9, 1991, at 10B. There was a delay in
seating the jury until after Thanksgiving, due to concern that pretrial publicity would
taint the jury over the holiday. Carolyn Pesce, Judge Delays Seating Smith Jury, USA
TODAY, Nov. 22, 1991, at 3A. Kennedy was acquitted of the rape charge. Mary
Jordan, Jury Finds Smith Not Guilty of Rape; Quick Verdict Ends Emotional Legal
Battle, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1991, at Al.
' Phil Berger, Can Trial of Tyson Be Fair?,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1992, at C7. In
a phone poll conducted before the trial of Mike Tyson, 70% of those who responded in
the Indianapolis area believed that Tyson could not get a fair trial due largely to the
heavy media coverage prior to trial. Id. Prior to trial, T-shirts were sold showing a
blindfolded Tyson holding a scale of justice with the words "Can Mike Tyson Get a Fair
Trial?" Id. Tyson was found guilty on one count of rape and two counts of criminal
deviate conduct. E.R. Shipp, Tyson Found Guilty on 3 Counts As IndianapolisRape
Trial Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1992, at Al.
2 DahmerExaminations to be Sealed Before Trial, UPI, Jan. 3, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. Dahmer's attorneys claimed prior to jury selection
that the heavy pretrial publicity in the Milwaukee area would make it difficult to seat a
jury. Id. Because Dahmer pled guilty to fifteen counts of first-degree intentional
homicide, his trial dealt solely with the issue of insanity. Edward Walsh, Jury Finds
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required that an impartial jury be selected.35
The requirement of impartiality has been criticized by some
commentators. As Mark Twain observed, after all of the people who
have been exposed to publicity are weeded out, only illiterates and
ignoramuses remain to carry out justice, turning trials into "sorrowful
farces. "26 It is also possible that the quality of the jury panel suffers
as a result of the requirement of impartiality in highly publicized
cases.

27

In 1960, the Supreme Court addressed this problem, stating
that "[s]carcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not
have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the
case." 28 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has required that jurors
enter the jury box impartial.29 Publicity must not be allowed to divert
the trial from the "very purpose of a court system. . . to adjudicate
controversies, both criminal and civil, in the calmness and solemnity
of the courtroom according to legal procedures. "30 A jury's verdict
must be based on evidence received in open court and not from
outside sources.31 It is well established that trials are not to be won

Dahmer Was Sane; Confessed Mass Killer FacesLife Sentence in Dismemberment Case,
WASH. POsT, Feb. 16, 1992, at Al.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
Ralph Frasca, Estimatingthe Occurrenceof Trials Prejudicedby Press Coverage,
72 JUDICATURE 162 n.9 (Oct. - Nov. 1988) (citing MARK TWAIN, RouOlNo IT 782-84
(University of Cambridge Press Syndicate 1984) (1871)).
" Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an ImpartialJurorin an Age of Mass
Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 631, 633 (1991). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reflected a similar viewpoint in 1874 when it stated that newspaper publicity may result
in significant cases being decided by jurors whose "dark minds have never been smitten
by the rays of intelligence." O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 424, 428 (1874). The
same observation was made more recently by a commentator who stated that General
Noriega would be "assured a fair trial only if the courts can summon '12 unbiased jurors
with the mental alertness of moist towelettes.'" Peter Richmond, Loon Over Miami:
The On-Target Humor of Dave Barry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at
44 (quoting Dave Barry).
' Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.'717, 722 (1961).
2 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961).
" Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 583 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
31Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966).
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by the use of newspaper and radio. 2
Prejudicial pretrial publicity is not a phenomenon limited to

recent years.33 Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court
noted its concern with prejudicial pretrial publicity.34 More recently,
Justice Holmes acknowledged the problem of selecting an impartial
jury from a community permeated with hostility toward the
defendant, when he noted, "[a]ny judge who has sat with juries
knows that in spite of forms they are extremely likely to be
impregnated by the environing atmosphere." 35 Adverse pretrial
publicity often damages a defendant's chances of obtaining a fair
trial.3 6 The sole fact that the media has reported on the defendant
may predispose a juror to believe that the defendant is guilty. 7
There has been a recent trend in Supreme Court cases to limit

32

Id. at 350 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941)).

3 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g). In
Burr, the court stated: "The jury should enter upon the trial with minds open to those
impressions which the testimony and the law of the case ought to make, not with those
preconceived opinions which will resist those impressions." Id. at 50. See also Spies
v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887) (upholding an 1874 statute allowing the seating of a
juror who has formed an opinion or impression based upon rumor or statements in
newspapers, if the juror states under oath that he believes he can fairly and impartially
reach a verdict based upon the law and evidence presented in court); Hopt v. Utah, 120
U.S. 430 (1887) (upholding the seating of jurors who had read of the case in the
newspaper, but had stated that they could be fair and impartial); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding the seating of a juror who believed he had formed
an opinion prior to trial, but did not think it would influence his verdict).
I See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, the Supreme
Court stated:

In these days of newspaper enterprise and universal education, every
case of public interest is almost, as a matter of necessity, brought to
the attention of all the intelligent people in the vicinity, and scarcely
any one can be found among those best fitted for jurors who has not
read or heard of it, and who has not some impression or some
opinion in respect to its merits.
Id. at 155-56.
3S Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Stanley S. Arkin, The Jury: Special Problems Involving Highly Publicized Case
or Client, in THE JuRY 1987, at 443 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 340, 1987).
37

Id.
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a defendant's claim of prejudice due to adverse pretrial publicity.
Whereas the Court once was apprehensive of a juror's claim of
impartiality,38 the present Court readily accepts it.39 Rather than
questioning the content of the juror's knowledge about the case, the
Court has left it up to the juror to decide if he or she can be
impartial.4 ° Such a trend is troubling, for it leaves the decision to the
jury to decide if they can be impartial. Ironically, as the reach of the
media grows and touches the eyes and ears of more people, a
defendant's ability to successfully claim prejudicial pretrial publicity
is diminishing.
Thirty years ago, the Court was more protective of
defendants' rights in highly publicized cases. In Irvin v. Dowd,41
eight of the twelve jurors believed that the defendant was guilty,
based on information reported in pretrial publicity. 42 Although the
jurors stated before trial that they could be fair and impartial,4" the
The Court
Supreme Court vacated the defendant's conviction.'

3 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966) ("[W]e did not
consider dispositive the statement of each juror 'that he would not be influenced by the
news articles, that he could decide the case only on the evidence of record, and that he
felt no prejudice against petitioner as a result of the articles.'") (quoting Marshall v.
United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959) (per curiam)); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961). In Irvin, the Supreme Court stated:

No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be fair
and impartial to petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring
such a declaration before one's fellows is often its father. Where so
many, so many times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of
impartiality can be given little weight.
Id. at 728.
39 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (holding that a trial court is not
required to ask prospectivejurors the content of what each has read or heard through the
media about the case).
'oId. at 1910 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4'366 U.S. 717 (1961).
42 Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728. The pretrial publicity included a barrage of cartoons,
articles, newspaper headlines, pictures, radio, and television reports. The stories
included the defendant's background, prior convictions, and claims of confessions. Id.
at 725-26.
43Id. at 728.
"Id.
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concluded that "[w]here so many, so many times, admitted prejudice,
such a statement of impartiality can be given little weight. "45
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of protecting
defendants from mere assurances by jurors of impartiality in
Sheppard v. Maxwell." The Court recognized that prejudicial and
unfair news comment had become increasingly prevalent.47 To insure
that due process is protected, the Supreme Court stated that trial
courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never
weighed against the accused, especially in high publicity cases.48
II. Voir Dire
Typical voir dire conditions are most often insufficient to
expose the bias that exists among potential jurors.49 To insure that
an impartial jury will be selected, a defendant has a right to make a
suitable inquiry to ascertain a juror's impartiality. 5" As early as
1895, the Supreme Court stated that it is permissible to make such an
inquiry in voir dire to determine whether a juror has any opinion,
prejudice, or bias that would affect his ability to decide the issues to

4'Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728. In Irvin, almost 90% of 370 prospectivejurors entertained

some opinion of guilt. Id. at 727. See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)
(massive, extensive, and prejudicial pretrial publicity prevented accused from receiving
a fair trial); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (pretrial publicity, including a
police interview of accused in jail which was later broadcast on two consecutive days,
prevented accused from receiving a fair trial).
4384 U.S. 333 (1966).
41Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362. The defendant was accused of murdering his wife.
The extensive pretrial publicity included criticism of the defendant by the prosecutor,
numerous newspaper editorials incriminating the defendant, newspaper stories of the
defendant's alleged extramarital affairs, and a public five and one-half hour interrogation
of the defendant attended by the media. Id. at 338-42.
'Id. at 362.
49NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 1.02[1], at
1-2 (2d ed. 1983). Numerous studies have found that prospective jurors tend to hide
their true prejudices during voir dire, some even lying during court questioning. Newton
N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media?, 40
AM. U. L. REv. 631, 650 (1991).
-" Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895).

1992]

PRETRIAL PUBLICITY

115

be tried in the case.51 Such an inquiry is to be conducted under the
supervision of the court, within its sound discretion, in both civil and
criminal cases.52
Without an adequate voir dire, the trial court's duty to remove
impartial jurors cannot be met.53 To protect the accused from
inadequate voir dire, the Court has recognized a defendant's right to
take reasonable steps to insure that a jury is impartial. 4 Among these
reasonable steps, and perhaps the most important, is the jury
challenge.55 Speaking for a unanimous Court in 1894, the first
Justice Harlan stated that the right to challenge was "one of the most
important of the rights secured to the accused" and that "[a]ny system
for the impaneling of a jury that prevents or embarrasses the full,
unrestricted exercise by the accused of that right, must be
condemned. "56
The purpose of voir dire is not merely to aid the trial judge
in determining whether a prospective juror should be excused for
cause. 57 The purpose of voir dire is also to enable a party to
intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges. 5" A party must
therefore be given ample opportunity to inquire into those issues

S Id. In Connors, the Supreme Court held that there was no error.in disallowing

a question to a prospective juror inquiring as to his political affiliation in a criminal case
involving the theft of a ballot box. Id. at 414.
52 Id. at 413.
5 Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981).
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 532 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
" Id. Other reasonable steps that a defendant can take to insure an impartial jury
include requesting a continuance of the trial and a change of venue. Groppi v.
Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1971).
' Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
17A challenge for cause is defined as a "request from a party to a judge that a
certain prospective juror not be allowed to be a member of the jury because of specified
causes or reasons." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 230 (6th ed. 1990).
- See generally Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). A peremptory challenge
is the "right to challenge a juror without assigning, or being required to assign, a reason
for the challenge." BLACc'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed, 1990). The Supreme
Court has explained the essential nature of the peremptory challenge as being "exercised
without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."
Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
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which may cause a juror to be unduly influenced.5 9
Naturally, the right to challenge has little power if a defendant
is not given the opportunity to ask relevant questions on voir dire
upon which the challenge for cause can be based.' It is precisely for
this reason that the Court has held that " [p] reservation of the
opportunity to prove actual
bias is a guarantee of a defendant's right
61
jury."
to an impartial
Some commentators claim that it would be detrimental to the
swift administration of law to expand voir dire questioning.62 Yet, a
single open-ended question that permits a prospective juror to speak
a few sentences can disclose more information in a shorter period of
time than numerous extensive leading questions.63 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has stated that it would be "far more injurious to
permit it to be thought that persons entertaining a disqualifying
prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and that inquiries designed
to elicit the fact of disqualification were barred. No surer way could
be devised to bring the processes of justice into disrepute. '"6 Thus,
without an adequate voir dire, it is impossible for a court to
satisfactorily determine which prospective jurors, if any, are
prejudiced against the accused, thereby endangering the defendant's
constitutional right to an impartial jury.

Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 602 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). In Stuart, Justice Brennan approved of defense counsel using searching
questions to discover bias "to facilitate intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges and
to help uncover factors that would dictate disqualification for cause." Id.
' Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 532 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
61 Id. (quoting Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1950)).
6 See Ralph Frasca, Estimating the Occurrence of Trials Prejudiced by Press
Coverage, 72 JUDICATURE 162 (Oct. - Nov. 1988). The State of Virginia argued in
Mu 'Minv. Virginia that should the Supreme Court allow the voir dire questions Mu'Min
advocated, the problems of congestion, delay, and expense would adversely affect the
criminal courts. Brief for Respondent at 15, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899
(1991) (No. 90-5193).
' NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWoRK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 2.1112], at
2-53 (2d ed. 1983).
" Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 315 (1931).
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A. A JurorNeed Not be Totally Ignorant
of the Facts to be Impartial
It is well established that it is not required for a juror to be
totally ignorant of the facts in order to be impartial.65 A juror's
impartiality is not necessarily destroyed when the juror is exposed to
pretrial publicity." In most cases it is a mistake to presuppose that
every potential juror exposed to publicity is irreparably tainted.67 A
juror's mere exposure to information about a defendant's criminal
history or the crime with which the defendant is charged does not
alone presumptively deprive the defendant of due process. 8
Actually, those people who read the paper daily may be the best
qualified to think clearly about the issues in a case. 9

6 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). See also Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S.
794, 799-800 (1975).
66 United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir. 1978).
67

NATIONAL JURY PROjECT, JURYwoRK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 10.03[3], at

10-45 (2d ed. 1983).
' Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975). See also United States v. Burr, 25
F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g). In Burr, the court noted:
[Ljight impressions which may fairly be supposed to yield to the
testimony that may be offered, which may leave the mind open to a
fair consideration of that testimony, constitute no sufficient objection
to a juror; but that those strong and deep impressions which will
close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in
opposition to them, which will combat that testimony, and resist its
force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him.
Id. at 51.
6 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g). In
Burr, the court stated:

Mo say that any man who had formed an opinion on any fact
conducive to the final decision of the case would therefore be
considered as disqualified from serving on the jury, would exclude
intelligent and observing men, whose minds were really in a situation
to decide upon the whole case according to the testimony, and would
perhaps be applying the letter of the rule requiring an impartial jury
with a strictness which is not necessary for the.preservation of the
rule itself.
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The Court has repeatedly held that it is sufficient if the juror
can lay aside his opinion or impression and render a verdict based
solely on the evidence presented at trial.70 Such a standard is
required regardless of the heinousness of the alleged crime, the
apparent guilt of the defendant, or the position in life he occupies. 71
The Court has recognized that to demand complete ignorance in a
potential juror would be an impossible standard to meet, especially
in today's age of swift and widespread communication. 72
B. A Trial Court has Broad Discretion
in Conducting Voir Dire
An affirmative duty has been placed on trial courts to ensure
that the jury enters the courtroom impartial .7' Because the juror is
poorly placed to pass judgment as to his or her own impartiality, the
trial court should make this determination.74 The Supreme Court has
established that trial judges must take strong measures in jury
selection to guarantee that the balance is never weighed against the
accused.75 The determination of impartiality is particularly within the
province of the trial judge. 7' The judge should broadly explore the
extent to which potential jurors have been exposed to pretrial
publicity.77 Attorneys must be given great latitude in voir dire in

Id. at 51. See also NATIONAL JURY PROIECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES
§ 10.03[3], at 10-45 (2d ed. 1983) ("Those who read the paper regularly may be the best
informed people and the most likely to be able to think clearly about the issues in the
case.").

'0Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
"' Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722.
72 Id.

7 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
7' United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir. 1978).
" Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362.
76Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
77Id. at 602 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan noted that a "judge should
broadly explore such matters as the extent to which prospective jurors had read
particular news accounts or whether they had heard about incriminating data such as an
alleged confession or statements by purportedly reliable sources concerning the
defendant's guilt."

Id.
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order to ensure that a fair and impartial jury is seated." Especially
in cases of extensive publicity, defense counsel should be allowed
more latitude to ask searching questions in order to uncover any
biases.79
Whenever a case receives any media attention, it is imperative
to find out what material jurors have been exposed to and what effect
that exposure has had on them. 0 It is essential to permit counsel
thorough probing." As early as 1895, the Supreme Court stated that
a juror being questioned on voir dire may be "asked any questions
that do not tend to his infamy or disgrace."8 2 The risk of bias is
especially high when the defendant is accused of terrifying and
abhorrent criminal behavior. 3 When a case has been heavily
publicized prior to trial, the need for more extensive voir dire
becomes greater to ensure that an impartial jury is seated. It is
beyond question "that uninhibited prejudicial pretrial publicity may
destroy the fairness of a criminal trial. ""4 Even if guilt is believed to
be clear, the dignity of the law is best preserved by determining that
guilt through the processes of law and not by extraneous influences. 85
Therefore, a defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury
would best be assured by a trial court which plays an active role in
determining whether a juror is truly impartial.8 6

78

id.

I Id. Allowing defense counsel to ask more searching questions to prospective
jurors facilitates peremptory challenges and disqualification for cause. Id.
80 NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 10.03[3], at
10-45 (2d ed. 1983).
81Id.
' Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878).
' Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 39 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
" Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
' Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 202 (1952) (Frankfurter,J., dissenting).
" Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 601-04 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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C. Juror'sAssurances of Impartiality are Insufficient
The Supreme Court, lower courts, and numerous social
scientists and commentators have long recognized that under certain
circumstances, exposure to pretrial publicity creates so strong a
presumption of prejudice that a juror's claims of impartiality should
not be believed. 87 Chief Justice Marshall recognized in 1807 that
although a juror may declare that he can set aside his prejudices and
be governed by the evidence presented in court, he is not to be
trusted.88 It is more likely that such a juror will listen favorably to
the testimony which confirms his opinion than that which would
change it.8 9
When a potential juror has admitted exposure to pretrial
publicity, the juror's assertion of impartiality alone is also insufficient
for constitutional purposes." The absence of prejudicial answers
cannot be equated with the absence of prejudice.9" A juror asked if
there was a reason he or she could not be fair and impartial would
naturally answer negatively, due to human pride.'
In some circumstances, prejudice against the accused can be

s7 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961). See also Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S.
794, 800 (1975); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966); Marshall v. United
States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959) (per curiam); United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190,
197 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 375 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); Amicus Curiae Brief for Petitioner at 1-11, Mu'Min v.
Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-5193); NATIONAL JURY PROJEcr, JURYWORK:
SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES §10.03[3], at 10-46 (2d ed. 1983).
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g).
Id. The Supreme Court, however, has also been reluctant to accept a prospective
juror's claims of partiality. In 1878, the Supreme Court noted "we have so often
observed in our experience, that jurors not unfrequently seek to excuse themselves on
the ground of having formed an opinion, when, on examination, it turns out that no real
disqualification exists." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878).
'o Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1916 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91 United States v. Poludniak, 657 F.2d 948, 961 (8th Cir. 1981) (Lay, C.J.,
dissenting). See also Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (per curiam)
(finding a new trial should be granted when seven jurors had been exposed to news

accounts during the trial and claimed they would not be influenced by them).
I United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 375 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 970 (1973).
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presumed.93 Specifically in cases involving extensive pretrial
publicity, a sizable number of jurors are likely to be unaware of their
own biases.' Many jurors may be unwilling to openly express their
biases, particularly in a courtroom setting with attorneys, fellow
jurors, reporters, and a judge present.9 Some jurors may be tempted
to understate their recollection of the case because they feel a duty to
their community "to follow through" and to find the defendant
guilty.96

A stark example of why a juror's assurances of impartiality
are insufficient is evident when examining the voir dire of
Commonwealth v. Saxe,97 a 1976 murder and bank robbery trial in
Massachusetts.
A total of 146 jurors were excused for already
having formed an opinion.98 More than one quarter of these 146
jurors had previously denied having an opinion.99
One potential juror repeatedly asserted that although she had
read newspaper accounts about the case, she could be fair and
impartial." She continuously denied having any opinion as to the

Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798-99 (1975). In Murphy, the Supreme Court
noted that prejudice had been presumed in earlier cases when a conviction was "obtained
in a trial atmosphere that had been utterly corrupted by press coverage." Id. at 798.
See Sheppard, v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (overturning defendant's conviction
when trial was infected with extremely inflammatory pretrial publicity and disruptive
conduct by the media during trial); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (reversing
defendant's conviction when trial was conducted in a "circus atmosphere" due to
intrusions by the press in the courtroom during the trial); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963) (overturning defendant's conviction when defendant's twenty minute
"confession" had been broadcast three times on a television station in the community
where the crime and trial took place).
Amicus Curiae Brief for Petitioner at 1, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899
(1991) (No. 90-5193).
9 Id.
%Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1044 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' Suffolk. County Super. Ct. No. 51775-77 (1976). For a discussion of Saxe, see
§ 10.03[3], at 10-46
to 10-49 (2d ed. 1983).
9 Amicus Curiae Brief for Petitioner at 7, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899
(1991) (No. 90-5193).
9 Id.
NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYwORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES

100NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK:

at 10-47 (2d ed. 1983).

SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES

§ 10.03[31,
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defendant's guilt or innocence. 1 ' The prospective juror was asked
if what she had seen on the television, heard on the radio, or read in
the newspaper had caused her to form any opinion as to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. °2
She replied: "No, none
whatsoever."' 03 When the juror was asked what she thought the
defendant had done, the juror admitted, "[wjell, we all know the girl
went in and held up the bank and the policeman was shot there."1 0"
A number of studies have concluded that prospective jurors'
initial denials of bias were often followed with evidence of prejudice
and partiality. 05 One commentator noted that jurors tend to
exaggerate their self-reported ability to be impartial."16 Most people
try to present themselves as honest rather than dishonest, fair rather
than unfair.10 7 This is partly due to the pressure jurors feel to present
themselves in the best possible light to those in the courtroom.l° A
prospective juror's natural reaction to embarrassment, public
exposure, stress, and group pressure will affect his or her response
to questions.'0 9 Moreover, courts have recognized that a juror is not

always cognizant of biases, attitudes, and opinions which may affect
impartiality.

10

101Id.
102id.
103id.
104 NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 10.03[3],
at 10-49 (2d ed. 1983). The juror was excused for cause. Id.
105
Amicus Curiae Brief for Petitioner at 9, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S.Ct. 1899
(1991) (No. 90-5193); Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an Impartial Juror
in an Age of Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631, 650 (1991).
1o6
Amicus Curiae Brief for Petitioner at 11, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S.Ct. 1899
(1991) (No. 90-5193) (citing ABA Comm. on Fair Trial and Free Press (1978)).
107NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 2.03[1], at

2-5 (2d ed. 1983).
108Amicus Curiae Brief for Petitioner at 13, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899
(1991) (No. 90-5193) (citing John L. Carroll, Speaking the Truth: Voir Dire in the
Capital Case, 3 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 199 (1979)).
109NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK:

SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 2.03[1], at

2-5 (2d ed. 1983).
11' See generally Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961);
Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959) (per curiam); United States v.
Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340,
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The greater the status difference between the interviewer and
the interviewee, the more likely the interviewee will give answers he
believes the interviewer would like to hear. I I I Because the judge is
the person of highest authority and status in the courtroom, a
prospective juror's candor is often inhibited. 112 Even when potential
jurors attempt to abide by a judge's instructions to reach a decision
based solely on the evidence presented in court, many of these jurors
may still be unable to control or avoid deep-rooted attitudes that can
affect decision-making. 1
Upon consideration of all of the
aforementioned conclusions reached by courts and commentators, the
Supreme Court's decision in Mu'Mn v. Virginia1 4 is all the more
troubling.
III. Mu'Min v. Virginia
The 1991 case Mu'Min v. VirginiaI"' is an ominous sign of
the future for defendants in highly publicized cases. The Supreme
Court held that courts are not constitutionally required to ask potential
jurors the content of the pretrial publicity to which they have been
exposed. 1 6 The trial court is only required to ask potential jurors if
they feel they can be impartial. 1 7 Rather than directing a trial court
to properly question potential jurors in voir dire to ensure their
impartiality, the Supreme Court discharged the trial court's obligation
by merely requiring courts to ask jurors if they thought they could be
118
fair.
In order to fully understand the ramifications of the recent
Supreme Court decision, it is necessary to examine the background

375 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973).
"I NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 2.03[1], at
2-6 (2d ed. 1983).
112Id.

"'
"4

Id. at 2-14, 2-15.
111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
I1
Id.

"6
"7

Id. at 1903.
Id. (emphasis added).
IId. at 1910 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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of the case. Dawud Majid Mu'Min, a college graduate literate in
four languages," 9 was convicted in 1973 of murder and grand larceny

and sentenced to forty-eight years in prison.20 Some fifteen years
later, while Mu'Min was working in a prison furlough program with
the Virginia Department of Transportation, Gladys Nopwasky was
stabbed to death in the retail carpet store that she owned.1 21 Media
reports indicated that she was discovered in a pool of blood, with her
clothes pulled off and semen on her body.122 Mu'Min was later
charged with the crime.123 Due to the nature of the violent crime, the
fact that the accused was in a prison furlough program at the time of
the alleged crime, and the fact that Mu'Min had previously been
convicted of murder, the case received extensive prejudicial pretrial
publicity. 124 An additional factor contributing to the heightened press
coverage of the crime was the fact that on the average, fewer than six
homicides occurred each year in the community where Nopwasky
was killed.125
Almost all of the media accounts were extremely prejudicial
to Mu'Min.126 These accounts included reports of Mu'Min's juvenile

119Mu'Min v. Virginia, 389 S.E.2d 886, 891 (Va. 1990), af'd, 111 S. Ct. 1899

(1991).
20 Pierre Thomas, Va. Prisoners Banned From Urban Road Crews; Baliles Acts

After Prince William Slaying, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1988, at D8. At the age of 19,
Mu'Min was convicted for the 1973 shooting of a Grayson County cab driver. Brief for
Petitioner at 6, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-5193). See also
Pierre Thomas, Inmate Said to Admit to Killing; Convict Charged in Fatal Stabbing of
Dale City Storekeeper, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1988, at C3.
121Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'22 Id.
12

at 1911 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Pierre Thomas, Va. Inmate Charged in Store Slaying; Convicted Killer Was in

Trusty Program, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1988, at B1.
24 Avis Thomas-Lester, U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Appeal in Dale City Killing,
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1991, at V1. The newspapers covering the case included not only
local papers such as The Potomac News, The Weekly Messenger, and The Prince William
Journal, but also The Richmond Tunes and The Washington Post. Brief for Petitioner
at 5 n.1, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-5193).
"2Avis Thomas-Lester, U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Appeal in Dale City Killing,
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1991, at VI, V5.
"2 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1911 (1991') (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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record in New York and Virginia 127 and the fact that Mu'Min had
been rejected for parole six times. 128 Other stories reported that
Mu'Min was suspected of beating another inmate while awaiting trial
for the murder of Nopwasky. 129 The media also reported that
Mu'Min had twenty-three prison rule violation citations,13 ° but failed
to include the fact that many of these infractions were for minor
violations of prison regulations such as refusing to serve pork to other
31
inmates because of his religious beliefs, and standing improperly.
Mu'Min was often referred to in the press as a "convicted
murderer," "lustful," and not a "model prisoner. ' 12 A headline
printed before the trial proclaimed: "Laxity was factor in sex
killing."13 However, it was never established that the Victim was
sexually assaulted. 134 Another headline stated: "Murderer confesses
to killing woman. "135 Mu'Min never did in fact confess to the
crime. 136
The media also reported heavily on Mu'Min's prior
conviction for the robbey and murder of a taxi driver in 1973.137
One report included a statement from the Grayson County prosecutor
that the death penalty was not available when the accused was

17 Brief for Petitioner at 7, Mu'Min v.

Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-

5193).
'm Id. at 6.
'2 Id. at 5. It is believed that this information was released to the press by an order
of the District Attorney. Id. at 5-6.

'30 Id. at 6.

Brief for Petitioner at 6, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 905193).
Id. at 6-7.
13 Id. at 7.
" Id. See also Pierre Thomas, Va. Inmate Convicted of Murder;Merchant Stabbed
in Dale City Store, WASH. POsT, Apr. 21, 1989, at Bi.
13S Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1911 (1991) (Marshall, I., dissenting).
Similarly, one headline proclaimed: "Inmate Said to Admit to Killing." Pierre Thomas,
Inmate Said to Admit to Killing; Convict Charged in Fatal Stabbing of Dale City
1l2

I
.
Storekeeper, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1988, at C3.
136Joint Appendix at 9, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-5193).
The transcript of the pre-trial hearing states that Mu'Min never confessed to killing
Nopwasky; he only made several statements to people. Id.
Mu'Min v. Virginia, 389 S.E.2d 886, 899 (Va. 1990) (Whiting, J., dissenting),
aiffd, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
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previously convicted. 3 '
It was further alleged that Mu'Min had murdered Nopwasky

after escaping from a Virginia Department of Transportation work
detail program. 39 This element added to the tremendous amount of
publicity surrounding the case, as press reports and the public were
critical of convicted criminals participating in a work detail
program. 4 The crime prompted local officials to curtail such inmate
release programs. 4 ' The Governor of Virginia later dismantled the
42
eighty-two year old program as a result of the public outcry.1
Local politicians in Virginia contributed to the widespread

'
Mu'Min, 389 S.E.2d at 899 (Va. 1990) (Whiting, J., dissenting), aff'd, 111 S.
Ct. 1899 (1991).
"9 Pierre Thomas, Escapee's Murder Trial Opens; Store Owner Slain in
Woodbridge, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1989, at B3. At the time of the killing, Mu'Min
was incarcerated in a state minimum-security prison camp. Id. Mu'Min took part in
a state highway department work program and was assigned to work in a maintenance
shop about a mile from the site of the murder. Pierre Thomas, Va. Inmate Convicted
of Murder; Merchant Stabbed in Dale City Store, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1989, at B1.
As part of the prison furlough program, state felons worked for the Virginia highway
department without armed supervision by the Department of Corrections. Rather, they
were supervised by unarmed personnel of the highway department. Only prisoners who
were considered minimum-security risk inmates were permitted to participate in the
program. Pierre Thomas, Va. Inmate ChargedIn Store Slaying; Convicted Killer was
in Trusty Program, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1988, at B1.
" Pierre Thomas, Va. Inmate Convicted ofMurder; MerchantStabbed in Dale City
Store, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1989, at B1. See also Pierre Thomas, Inmate Said to
Admit to Killing; Convict Charged in Fatal Stabbing of Dale City Storekeeper, WASH.
POST, Oct. 7, 1988, at C3; Pierre Thomas, Va. Officials Probing Prisoner'sEscape
From Work Crew, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1988, at D3; Pierre Thomas, Va. Inmate
Charged in Store Slaying; Convicted Killer was in Trusty Program,WASH. POST, Oct.
4, 1988, at B1.
"'1Pierre Thomas, Va. Inmate Convicted of Murder;Merchant Stabbed in Dale City
Store, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1989, at B1. See also Joint Appendix at 10, Mu'Min v.
Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-5193) (indicating that Governor Bares
changed the entire furlough program in the state of Virginia because of the Mu'Min
case).
142Pierre Thomas, Va. PrisonersBanned From Urban Road Crews; Baliles Acts
After Prince William Slaying, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1988, at Dl. See also Dana Priest,
Va. Halts Furloughsfor Inmates Convicted of Violent Crimes, WASH. POST, Nov. 24,
1988, at Dl.
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press accounts. 43 The local congressman stated he was "deeply
distressed by news that my constituent Gladys Nopwasky was
murdered by a convicted murderer serving in a highway department
work program" and demanded an explanation of the "decisions that
allowed a person like Dawud Mu'Min to commit murder." 1" This
statement was made before the trial even took place. 145
Other politicians presumed Mu'Min was guilty and publicized
their views about the case. 146 The local congressman's opponent in
the 1988 campaign, a member of the Virginia House of Delegates,
wrote an editorial in which he stated, "I am outraged that a
of Corrections inmate apparently murdered a resident of
Department 147
Dale City."
Still more publicity arose due to the release of an eight page
report of an investigation of the Mu'Min case, conducted by the'
Virginia corrections department. 148 The report indicated several
possible violations of corrections and transportation department
regulations, including lax supervision, failure to conduct regular head
counts, and9 failure to report inmate possession of alcohol and
14
weapons.
Further publicity arose because the killing took place in the
midst of a presidential campaign which focused on Governor Michael

14 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1912 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See generally Pierre Thomas, Va. PrisonersBanned From Urban Road Crews; Baliles
Acts After Prince William Slaying, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1988, at DI; Pierre Thomas,
Va. Inmate Charged In Store Slaying; Convicted Killer was in Trusty Program, WASH.
POST, Oct. 4, 1988, at B1. See also Dana Priest, Va. Halts Furloughs for Inmates
Convicted of Violent Crimes, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1988, at D1.
I4 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1912 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
145id.
146 Joint

Appendix at 10, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-

5193).
'47 Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1912 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
11 Pierre Thomas, Va. PrisonersBanned From Urban Road Crews; Baliles Acts
After Prince William Slaying, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1988, at Dl.
1' Id. The report specifically stated that transportation department personnel
assigned to Mu'Min's facility "did not like to supervise inmates and/or did not want
them around the facility, tried to avoid inmates, were afraid of or ... intimidated by
them." Id. The report also indicated that transportation department personnel failed to
conduct routine head counts on the day Nopwasky was murdered. Id.
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S. Dukakis' furlough of convicted murderer Willie Horton.15° The
furlough issue of the Presidential campaign heightened the intensive
coverage of Mu'Min's alleged escape from the work detail
program. 5 The crime Mu'Min was accused of closely resembled the
Willie Horton case in Massachusetts; 2 because of this similarity,
Mu'Min's case became locally identified with the national debate."'
Edward W. Murray, director of the Virginia Department of
Corrections, acknowledged that the explosive public reaction had
been intensified by the national presidential campaign. "4 He stated,
"[i]f you're sitting in my seat and looking at what's going on and the
momentum that's building up . . .it's better to pull back and do a
self-evaluation. This campaign caused a lot of confusion . . .The
world's in an uproar right now." 1"
From the time Mu'Min was arrested until the beginning of
Mu'Min's trial, the case received constant publicity."5 6 There was an

" Ruth Marcus, High Court Hears Va. Murder Case; Publicity at Issue in Appeal
of Dale City Store Owner's Killer, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1991, at B6. Willie Horton,
a convicted first-degree murderer, escaped from a Massachusetts furlough program in
1986, raped a woman, and stabbed her boyfriend. Dukakis Signs Law Banning Lifer
Furloughs, UPI, Apr. 29, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. The
Horton case was used in the 1988 Presidential campaign to portray Democratic
Presidential candidate Michael S. Dukakis as being soft on crime. Jacob V. Lamar, The
One That Got Away: Why an EscapedMurdererHauntsMichael Dukakis, TIME, June
27, 1988, at 22. In fact, at the time, Massachusetts was among 45 states which
permitted prison leaves. Id. Moreover, the escape rate from the Massachusetts furlough
program from 1972 to 1988 was only .36%. Id. Nevertheless, the tremendous publicity
directed toward the Horton case, which was ultimately felt by Mu'Min, led to the
banning of furloughs for first-degree murderers in the state of Massachusetts. Dukakis
Signs Law Banning Lifer Furloughs, UPI, Apr. 29, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File.
15 Dana Priest, Va. Halts Furloughsfor Inmates Convicted of Violent Crimes,
WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1988, at Dl.
112 One Defendant's Publicity ....
BOSTON GLOBE, June 5, 1991, at 14. See supra
note 150.
1 See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
15 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"'

Dana Priest, Va. Halts Furloughsfor Inmates Convicted of Violent Crimes,

WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1988, at D1. Due to the overwhelming publicity of the furlough

issue in the presidential campaign, virtually every furlough program in the nation was
reviewed by state authorities. Id.
'm Joint Appendix at 8, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S.Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-5193).
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average of one article a day concerning the case from Mu'Min's
3, 1988, to April 17, 1989, the day the trial
arrest on October
1 17
commenced.
Shortly before the trial date, Mu'Min's counsel submitted
sixty-four proposed voir dire questions to the trial judge and filed a
motion for individual voir dire."' The court refused to ask any of
the proposed content questions; that is, those dealing with the content
of the news items that the potential jurors had seen or read.15 9 The
trial court also denied Mu'Min's motion for individual voir dire, but
ruled that if necessary, the venire would be broken down into panels
of four to deal with publicity issues.1 " Mu'Min's motion for a
change of venue was also denied by the trial court.16
Of the sixty-four questions Mu'Min submitted, the trial judge
allowed only twenty-four to be asked.162 Most of the questions the
court did allow were closed-ended; ones in which the juror needed
only to answer "yes" or "no. "163 The closed-ended questions
included: "Have you acquired any information about this case from
the newspapers, television, conversations or any other source?" and
1s7Id. at 6-7.
"

Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1902.

159Id.

"~Id. The trial court's reasoning for denying the motion for individual voir dire
was to avoid causing prospective jurors to feel uncomfortable in the courtroom. The
trial court wanted to avoid putting the jurors "in a position of where they may well feel
that'they're the ones that are on trial." Joint Appendix at 17, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111
S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-5193). The Virginia court's reasoning is contrary to other
courts' findings. For example, the Seventh Circuit stated in United States v. Dellinger,
472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973), that "it is undoubtedly
possible to question the prospectivejurors about pretrial publicity without exposing other
members of the venire to the publicity. The procedure of individual questioning... is
of course one method." Dellinger, 472 F.2d. at 376. The American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice also advocate the use of individual voir dire in cases
involving substantial publicity. The relevant rule states: "If there is a substantial
possibility that individual jurors will be ineligible to serve because of exposure to
potentially prejudicial material, the examination of each juror with respect to exposure
shall take place outside the presence of other chosen and prospective jurors." ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-3.5(a) (2d ed. 1980).
161Joint Appendix at 14, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 905193).
162Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1902 n.2 (1991).
"oSee id. at 1919 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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"Have you discussed this case with anyone?" 1 4 None of the twentyfour questions which the trial judge permitted were content
questions.16 Mu'Min argued that content questions would materially
assist in obtaining a jury less likely to be tainted by pretrial
publicity. ' The content questions the court refused to allow
included: "What have you seen, read, or heard about this case?,"
"From whom or what did you get this information?," and "When and
where did you get this information?" ' 7
Prior to trial, sixteen of the twenty-six prospective jurors had
acquired information relating to the case from the news media or
other source.16" Mu'Min's motion to excuse all potential jurors who
had indicated they had been exposed to pretrial publicity was
denied.169 The trial court then conducted further questioning of the
potential jurors in panels of four, but never inquired about the content
of what they had heard or read about the case prior to trial. 170 A
renewed motion for a change1 of venue based on pretrial publicity was
17
again denied by the court.
The entire jury selection process took less than one day.172
Of the twelve jurors who eventually recommended that Mu'Min be
sentenced to death, eight had heard or read something about the
case. 173 Exactly what the jury knew prior to trial was never
determined by the court, as all of the defense counsel's proposed

ld. at 1902 n.2.
I

id. at 1902.
I
Id. at 1905.
I
at 1902 n.2. The trial court relied on Rule 14A of the Model Voir Dire
Questions in the Judge's Handbook to justify denying the proposed content questions.
Rule 14A states: "Have any of you acquired any information about the alleged offense
or the accused from the news media or other sources, and if so, would that information
affect the impartiality in this case?" Joint Appendix at 31, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S.
Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-5193).
'0 Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1902.
169Id.
'70Id. at 1902-03.
171Id. at 1902.
"T Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No.
90-5193).
'7' Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 1903 (1991).
''Id.
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content questions were denied. 174
Less than seventy-two hours after the trial began, the jury
convicted Mu'Min of capital murder. 175 It took the jury only ninety
minutes of deliberation to reach their decision.1 76 Shortly thereafter,
the jury recommended that Mu'Min be sentenced to death. 177 The
trial judge accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced
Mu'Min to death."7 '
In a four to three vote, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction of Mu'Min, stating that an opportunity to ask content
questions is not a right guaranteed by the Constitution. 179 The court
ruled that a defendant is entitled to know only whether a potential
juror has formed an opinion and, if so, whether the juror can be
indifferent.1 0
The dissent contended that because the defense counsel was
not afforded a meaningful voir dire examination of prospective jurors,
there was no assurance that the constitutional right to an impartial
jury was met."' The dissent stated that the questions refused by the
court were clearly designed to provide a factual and objective basis
for assessing the potential for bias.182 The dissent argued that
because some prospective jurors may honestly have believed that the
publicity had not affected their impartiality, a disclosure of what was
actually remembered could lead the court to conclude that there was
a bias of which the potential juror was unaware. 8
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of

'74

Brief for Petitioner at 11, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-

5193).
'"Id.at 14.
176Pierre Thomas, Va. Inmate Convicted ofMurder; Merchant Stabbed in Dale City

Store, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1989, at B1.
"7Brief for Petitioner at 15, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 905193).
178id.

'" Mu'Min v. Virginia, 389 S.E.2d 886, 893 (Va. 1990), aft'd, 111 S. Ct. 1899

(1991).
'
18

Mu'Min, 389 S.E.2d at 893.
Id. at 899 (Whiting, J., dissenting).
Id. at 901 (Whiting, J., dissenting).

183 Id.
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Mu'Min in a five to four vote.1 ' In an opinion joined by Justices
White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter, Chief Justice Rehnquist held
that the Constitution does not require a trial court to ask questions
specifically dealing with the content of pretrial publicity to which
each juror has been exposed."8 5 The majority admitted that there was
a certain common sense appeal to using content questions.1 16 Justice
Rehnquist even conceded that such questions might cause some
prospective jurors to re-evaluate their own answers as to whether they
had formed an opinion about the case. 187 Justice Rehnquist further
acknowledged that content questions might be helpful in determining
whether a jury is, in fact, impartial.' 88 But the majority concluded
that a trial court's failure to ask content questions does not render the
defendant's trial fundamentally unfair, and therefore such questions
are not constitutionally required."8 9
The majority admitted that content questions would give the
court a better sense of a juror's outlook on life, which would be
helpful in exercising peremptory challenges. 1 O But the Supreme
Court concluded that because peremptory challenges are not
constitutionally required,"9 " content questions about pretrial publicity
cannot be a constitutional requirement." 9 The majority reaffirmed
the principle that a trial court's finding of impartiality may be
overturned only when there is manifest error.'93 The Court reasoned
that because there was no "wave of public passion" in this case, there
was no reason to disbelieve the jurors' claims that they could be
impartial. 's4

's

Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1901 (1991).

'i

Id. at 1905.

'"Id.
1 Id.
In Id.
1 Id.
'9 Mu'Min, 111 S.Ct. at 1905.
" Id. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988) ("We have long recognized
that peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension.").
192Mu'Min, 111 S.Ct. at 1905.
Id. at 1907.
Id. The majority cited to Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), as a case with a
"wave of public passion." Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1907. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that
in Irvin, news accounts included details of the defendant's history of confessing to 24
'9
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In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor noted that the trial
judge could have done more. 1 Justice O'Connor acknowledgedthat
content questions may have been helpful in finding the truth, as a
juror's tone of voice or demeanor in answering content questions may
have suggested to the trial judge that a juror had formed an opinion
about the case." 9 But Justice O'Connor concluded that content
questions are not so indispensable as to be constitutionally required.1 97
In a dissent joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,"'8
Justice Marshall stated that the majority's decision turns the right to
an impartial jury into a "hollow formality." 199 Believing that this case
was essentially one of first impression, 2' the dissent determined that
the only firm conclusion that could be drawn from impartial-jury
jurisprudence was that a potential juror's assurances that he is
impartial cannot be dispositive of the defendant's rights. 01 The
dissent stressed that a trial court cannot realistically assess a juror's
impartiality without first establishing what the juror has already
learned about the case.20 2
The dissent concluded that content questioning should be part
of the voir dire for three reasons. 2 3 The first reason is to determine
whether the type and extent of the pretrial publicity to which a
prospective juror was exposed to would automatically disqualify the

burglaries and six murders, whereas in Mu'Min, much of the pretrial publicity was
directed at the Department of Corrections and the criminal justice system. Id. Although
the majority admitted that the Mu Min case may have received more coverage than most
capital murder cases because it occurred during the 1988 Presidential campaign, when
a similar crime became "a subject of national debate," Justice Rehnquist dismissed the
suggestion that such pretrial publicity would warrant a new trial, finding the publicity
in Mu'Min "was not of the same kind or extent as that found to exist in Irvin." Id. It
is difficult to understand the strained reasoning of the majority, as few events, if any,
match the tremendous barrage of publicity as a presidential campaign in the modem era.
' Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1909 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
196
Id.
197Id.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined in the dissent except for Part IV. Id. at
1899.
'99
Mu'Min, 111 S.Ct. at 1909 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 1913.
201Id.

Id. at 1910.
Id. at 1913.
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juror as a matter of law. 2 " The dissent noted that under certain
circumstances, exposure to particularly inflammatory publicity creates
so strong a presumption of prejudice that "'the jurors' claims that
they can be impartial should not be believed.'" 20 The second reason
given by the dissent was that by requiring content questions, a trial
court would be able to determine if the impartiality the juror
professes meets the same standard the Sixth Amendment demands. 1°
The final reason offered by the dissent was that content questions
help a court resolve accurately whether the juror's claim of
impartiality is believable. 2°7
Justice Kennedy dissented in a separate opinion. 20 ' According
to Justice Kennedy, a finding of impartiality must be based on
something more than the mere silence of the individual juror in
response to questions asked to a group. 2°9 Justice Kennedy found this
process insufficient and would require a more substantial exchange to
assess a juror's ability to be impartial.210
IV. Critique of Mu'Min v. Virginia
The Supreme Court's ruling in Mu'Min v. Virginia2 11 sets a
dangerous precedent in that it gives jurors wide discretion in deciding
if they can be impartial.212 In cases involving great publicity and a
heinous crime, like Mu'min, a prospective juror is not likely to admit
in the courtroom that they have formed an opinion about the case.21 3

204Id.

M Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1913 (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031
(1984)).

Mu'Min, 111 S.Ct. at 1914-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1915.
Id. at 1917 (Kennedy, J.,dissenting).
2 Id. at 1919.
2"' Justice Kennedy indicated that when a juror has been exposed to pretrial publicity,
he would require a trial court to "conduct a sufficient colloquy with the individual juror
to make an assessment of the juror's ability to be impartial." Id.
211 1 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
212Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1910 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
213 NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 2.04[1], at
2-8 (2d ed. 1983).
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The closed-ended questions that were relied on by the trial court in
Mu'Mn are not effective in gaining information about a prospective
juror's biases and attitudes. 214 Open-ended, non-leading questions
encourage a venire to explain their opinions and attitudes in their
own
215
words, thus penetrating their true standpoints and prejudices.
Because the media reports included Mu'Min's past arrests and
convictions, the Court should have allowed content questions. Such
media reports are recognized as highly prejudicial.216 The Supreme
Court has recognized that "prejudice to the defendant is almost
certain to be as great when that evidence reaches the jury through
217
news accounts as when it is a part of the prosecution's evidence.
Without determining which news reports eight of the twelve jurors
had been exposed to, it was impossible to ascertain if these jurors
were in fact prejudiced against the defendant.
The Mu'Mn decision is especially troubling in light of the
fact that media reports are not always accurate. Without affording
counsel the right to inquire if prospective jurors have been exposed
to inaccurate accounts, it is possible that the defendant will in effect
be tried by the media and not the jury. Although a juror may claim
that he or she can form an opinion based solely upon the evidence
presented in the courtroom, courts have held that such assurances are
insufficient.
The media reported that Mu'Min had c6nfessed to committing
the murder. 219 In fact, Mu'Min had never confessed. 22° No publicity
is more damaging to a defendant's criminal case than publicity that
the defendant has confessed to the crime of which he or she has been
charged."
Without establishing which jurors, if any, had been
exposed to the inaccurate report of Mu'Min's "confession," the court
214

Id. at 2-52.

215 Id. at 2-53.
216 Id. at § 7.04[1][c], at 7-19.
217 Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959).

211 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966). See also Murphy v. Florida,
421 U.S. 794 (1975); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); United States v. Davis, 583
F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1978).
29 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1911 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2 Joint Appendix at 9, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-5193).
221NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK:

at 7-19 (2d ed. 1983).

SYSTEMATIC TECHNQUES § 7.04[1][c],
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may have permitted prejudiced jurors to have been seated.
Likewise, media use of epithets, conclusory labels, or
exaggerated descriptions to refer to a defendant may jeopardize his
or her right to a fair trial.222 Press reports had described Mu'Min as
a "lustful" person who did "strange stuff. ''223 Because content
questions were not permitted, it was never established if the jurors
had been exposed to these biased descriptions.
The fact that Mu'Min was sentenced to death further justified
the asking of content questions. Numerous courts have recognized
that a greater degree of scrutiny is appropriate when the punishment
of death is a possibility. 2 The taint of bias in a capital sentencing
is especially severe in light of. the complete finality of the death
sentence.225 In 1931, the Court acknowledged that forbidding inquiry
as to prejudice becomes most grave when the issue is life or death. 6
Thirty years later, the Court reiterated this doctrine, stating "[w]ith
his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that [a defendant] be
tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public
passion." 227 Less than ten years ago, the Court reaffirmed this
reasoning by stating that the "qualitative difference of death from all
other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of
scrutiny in the capital sentencing determination."22 ' Particularly
where the jury selected is to determine not only guilt or innocence but
also life or death, an inadequate voir dire justifies setting the
judgment aside.229 Mu'Min was not afforded such protection.
The Court's decision also runs contrary to Virginia state law.
Virginia Code Section 8.01-358 mandates that "counsel for either
party shall have the right to examine under oath any person who is
called as a juror . . . and shall have the right to ask such person.
Id. at 7-20.
223Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1911 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S.
308 (1931).
5 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986).
226Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 314 (1931).
7 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961).
22 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986) (quoting California v. Ramos, 463
U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)).
2 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963).
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. directly any relevant question to ascertain whether he

sensible of any bias or prejudice."2 0

. .

. is

The legislative intent in

enacting Code 8.01-358 was to provide counsel with a meaningful
voir dire. 231 Because content questions are "relevant... to ascertain
232
whether [the juror] . . . is sensible of any bias or prejudice,"
Mu'Min's statutory right to question prospective jurors was
violated. 3
The Mu'Mn decision is also troubling in light of Mu'Min's
ability to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges .234 A refusal
by a trial judge to permit defense counsel to inquire into the extent
and nature of a prospective juror's exposure to publicity prior to trial
is a serious impairment of a defendant's right to exercise his or her
peremptory challenges intelligently.235 Because the trial court refused
to allow Mu'Min to inquire into the extent and nature of the content
which prospective jurors were exposed to, Mu'Min was not able to
use his peremptory challenges intelligently.

230 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (Michie 1991). The Virginia Supreme Court
dismissed the statutory argument propounded by Mu'Min, referring to an earlier decision
in which the court stated, in construing the statute, that

[a] party has no right, statutory or otherwise, to propound any
question he wishes, or to extend voir dire questioning ad infinitum.
The court must afford a party full and fair opportunity to ascertain
whether prospective jurors 'stand indifferent in the cause,' but the
trial judge retains the discretion to determine whether the parties
have had sufficient opportunity to do so.
Mu'Min v. Virginia, 389 S.E.2d 886, 892 n.5 (Va. 1990) (quoting LaVasseur v.
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 581 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984)).
2' Mu'Min v. Virginia, 389 S.E.2d 886, 900 (Va. 1990) (Whiting, J., dissenting).
232VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (Michie 1991).
2"3Mu'Min, 389 S.E.2d at 900 (Whiting, J., dissenting).
4 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
235 In 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted "[i]f
this [peremptory] right is not to be an empty one, the defendants must, upon request, be
permitted sufficient inquiry into the background and attitudes of the jurors to enable them
to exercise intelligently their peremptory challenges." United States v. Dellinger, 472
F.2d 340, 368 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973). See also Swain v.
Alabama,'380 U.S. 202 (1965). In Swain, the Supreme Court indicated the "long and
widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury." Id.
at 219.
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The Court has placed the burden on the challenger to show
the actual existence of an impartial opinion in the mind of a juror.236
In Mu'Min, the challenger was never even given the opportunity to
show the existence of impartiality. In an interview with Mu'Min
prior to the Supreme Court's ruling, Mu'Min explained: "How can
you find out what sort of preconceived ideas a juror might have if
you can't even ask the questions?"237 The trial judge failed to accord
defense counsel "[m]ore latitude in personally asking or tendering
searching questions that might root out indications of bias," as
advocated by Justice Brennan in 1975.23 s As a result, there is no
guarantee that the jurors who ultimately decided Mu'Min's fate were
in fact impartial. And as a result, Dawud Majid Mu'Min now waits
on death row.23 9

2m Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). See also Aldridge v. United States,
283 U.S. 308 (1931). In Aldridge, the Court noted: "As the juror best knows the
condition of his own mind, no satisfactory conclusion can be arrived at, without resort
to himself. Applying this test then, how is it possible to ascertain whether he is
prejudiced or not, unless questions similar to the foregoing are proposed to him?" Id.
at 313 n.3 (quoting People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347, 349 (1855)).
237David A. Kaplan & Bob Cohn, These ClientsAren't Fools, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 22,
1991, at 67. Some courts have used questionnaires to ascertain what publicity jurors
have been exposed to prior to trial. For example, potential jurors in the drug trafficking,
racketeering, and money laundering trial of General Manuel Noriega were sent a 27-page
form with 84 questions, specifically asking which newspapers they read. Larry Rohter,
For Noriega Jury: Many Are Called, None Chosen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1991, at
A23. Similarly, 500 prospective jurors for the trial of four Los Angeles police officers,
charged with the notorious beating of Rodney King, received a 40-page questionnaire
asking of their exposure to extensive media coverage prior to trial. Betsy Striesand, A
Nice Place to Live, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 10, 1992, at 18.
2m Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 602 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
239Mr. Mu'Min expressed his feelings of the fairness of his trial: "Trial by ambush
is not the fairness one expect[s] in a court of law. . . And when you know you are
innocent, but only get ambush[ed] again and again to keep you imprisoned, then your
faith in the justice process truly goes out the back door." Letter from Dawud Majid
Mu'Min to William Kastin, Editor in Chief, New York Law School Journalof Human
Rights 2 (Feb. 19, 1992) (on file with the New York Law School Journal of Human
Rights).
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V. Other JurisdictionalStandards
Largely because of the foregoing reasons, numerous
jurisdictions have endorsed the use of broader questioning in voir
dire. Various state courts have required trial courts to specifically
ask content questions to prospective jurors. In State v. Pokini,u° the
Supreme Court of Hawaii supported the use of content questions in
voir dire." The court stated that the examination of prospective
jurors in voir dire must be sufficiently detailed to discover whether
they hold any bias as a result of pretrial publicity. u2 The court found
that because the trial judge failed to allow inquiry into the extent and
nature of the publicity to which jurors had been exposed, the accused
was not afforded a fair trial.3 The court established that generalized
questioning by a trial judge is insufficient to adequately discover if
prospective jurors are in fact prejudiced by pretrial publicity. 4
Similarly, in State v. Bey,' 5 the New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed the conviction of a criminal defendant because of the jury's
potential exposure to prejudicial publicity.' Although the Bey case
dealt with mid-trial publicity, the court's reasoning can be applied to
cases involving pretrial publicity as well, as the court repeatedly used
pretrial publicity case law in reaching its decision.2 7
In Bey, the trial court warned prospective jurors of exposure
to pretrial publicity because of the media interest in the case.248

240 526 P.2d 94 (Haw. 1974).
241Id. at 100. The court found adverse pretrial publicity to be substantial, including

photographs of the defendants in handcuffs, radio and television coverage, and dozens
of newspaper articles. Id. at 99-100.
242 Id.at 100.
24 Id.
24 id.
24 548 A.2d 846 (N.J. 1988).
246Id. at 870.

247 See id. at 861-70 passim; see also id. at 868 n.27 ("Settled pretrial voir dire

principles should guide the court.., just as the jury selection case law does not demand
that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts, a juror need not be automatically excused due
to mid-trial publicity disclosing inadmissible evidence.").
' Id. at 863. The defendant was accused of murder, felony murder, aggravated
assault, and aggravated sexual assault. Id. at 848. At the time of the alleged crime, the
defendant was 17 years of age. Id. at 850 n.2.
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Because of the possibility of jury exposure to publicity, the trial judge
repeatedly warned prospective jurors not to read anything about the
case." 9 In addition to the charges the defendant faced at trial, Bey
had been indicted for the murder of another woman.25 °
On the day jury selection began, two local newspapers
reported defendant's prior record and the fact that he was facing
another murder trial." t One paper also contained a "strongly worded
commentary" criticizing lenient murder case sentences.2 1 2 Because of
these newspaper articles and numerous other articles appearing
throughout the jury selection process, Bey moved the court to declare
a mistrial or in the alternative to poll the jury to determine if any
jurors had been exposed to the prejudicial publicity. 253 The trial
judge denied both requests.2 s4
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred
by relying on its instructions alone, rather than polling the jury as to
possible exposure to the prejudicial articles.255 Although the court
noted the presumption that jurors generally act in good faith, the
court recognized that "in certain circumstances a criminal defendant
whose life or liberty is at stake might reasonably question the efficacy
of repeated admonitions. "s The court concluded that when there is
a realistic possibility that publicity may prejudice a defendant's right
to a fair trial, a voir dire should be conducted of the jurors

49Bey, 548 A.2d at 863. The trial judge repeated these warnings individually to
each juror before the trial began and twice a day during the trial. Id.
2 Id.at 864.
"' Id. The defendant had previously been convicted of robbery and assault. Id.
2
S2Id.
2" Bey, 548 A.2d at 864.
1 Id. The court reasoned that if the prospective jurors had been exposed to any
publicity about the case, they would have told the court as they had been instructed to
do. Id.

255d. The court stated that "due to the highly prejudicial nature of the information
contained in these articles, and the realistic possibility that it may have reached one or
more of the jurors, the court's refusal to poll the jury violated defendant's fair trial
rights and requires that his convictions be reversed." Id.
2m Id. at 865. See also State v. Finley, 355 S.E.2d 47 (W. Va. 1987), where the
court noted that a potential juror "need not affirmatively indicate bias or prejudice" to
warrant extensive voir dire examination. Id.at 50. The court reiterated its policy of
conducting "meaningful and effective voir dire" to provide a defendant with the
constitutional right to an impartial jury. Id. at 51.
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individually to determine exactly what was learned and to conclude
whether the jurors are capable of deciding the case in an unbiased
and impartial manner." 7 The court noted that it is better to be safe
than sorry: "While we do not mean to suggest that any publicity
relating to the defendant or the proceedings will automatically require
that the jury be polled, a court might properly choose to err on the
side of caution when ruling on such motions."258
Similarly, in State v. Goodson,"' the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that in cases which have a significant possibility of jurors
being exposed to prejudicial material, voir dire questioning should be
conducted for the purpose of determining what the prospective juror
has read and heard about the case. 2" In Goodson, reports of the
accused's alleged criminal activity were well publicized by local
newspapers, television, and radio.261 The court concluded that when
a potential juror has been exposed to and remembers reports of highly
significant information, such as incriminating matters or substantial
inflammatory material, the juror shall be subject to challenge for
cause without regard to the prospective juror's testimony as to state
of mind.262
The Mu'Min decision not only conflicts with various state
court decisions, but it also contradicts previous federal court rulings.
In Silverthorne v. United States,263 the court held that the trial court's
voir dire did not adequately dispel the probability of prejudice
towards the accused, as the court made no effort to ascertain what
2"Bey, 548 A.2d at 867-68.
MId. at 869.
z 412 So.2d 1077 (La. 1982).
o Id. at 1081.
I'
Id. at 1079. The defendant in Goodson introduced 108 pages of transcripts of
television newscasts and 35 newspaper articles, all reporting his case prior to trial. Id.
See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (holding that a televised three day
interrogation of defendant, contact with the jurors by the media, and newspeople in close
proximity to the jury and counsel during trial precluded defendant from receiving a fair
trial); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (holding that prejudice was presumed due.
to intrusions by the press during the course of the trial); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963) (reversing defendant's conviction where a 20 minute film of the confession
was broadcast three times by a local television station in a small community).
2 Goodson, 412 So.2d at 1081.
2 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968), af'd, 430 F.2d 675 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1022 (1971).
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information the jurors had become aware of and therefore had no way
of objectively deciding the impact of pretrial publicity on the jurors'
impartiality. 2 The court specifically stated that whether a juror can
render a verdict based solely on evidence presented in the courtroom
should not be determined on that juror's own assessment without
something more.265
The Seventh Circuit followed the reasoning of Silverthorne in
United States v. Dellinger.2 In Dellinger, the defendant's actions in
the 1968 Democratic National Convention had generated world-wide
publicity.267 The court, in noting the inherent impact that substantial
publicity will have upon prospective jurors, stated:
[W]here pretrial publicity is of a character and extent
to raise a real probability that veniremen have heard
and formed opinions about the events relevant to a
case, and at least where, as here, the defense has
brought the pretrial publicity to the court's attention
and requested voir dire inquiry, the court must make
inquiry adequate to determine whether anyone has
read or heard about the facts, and, if so, what the
impact has been on his ability to serve as an impartial
juror. 261
Similarly, in United States v. Davis,269 the Fifth Circuit ruled that
where the nature of the publicity raised a significant possibility of
prejudice, cursory questioning is not sufficient. 27° Rather, a trial
court should establish what each juror has heard or read and ascertain
how it affects a prospective juror's attitude toward the trial.27
Contrary to the standard endorsed by the Supreme Court in
Mu 'Mn, numerous jurisdictions have advocated individual voir dire

' Silverthorne, 400 F.2d at 638.
Id. at 639.
472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973).
Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 370.
2 Id. at 374.
583 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1978).
"7
Davis, 583 F.2d at 196.
27 Id.
2
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in cases involving extensive pretrial publicity. In State v. Finley,272

the West Virginia Court of Appeals noted that jurors who 'indicate
possible prejudice should either be excused or examined individually
to determine if bias actually exists.273 Similarly, the Supreme Court
of Tennessee approved of mandatory individual voir dire in certain
circumstances in State v. Claybrook.274 The court noted that this
standard should be followed in all criminal cases, and required in
cases where the defendant faces the death penalty.275
A number of state statutes and the American Bar Association
also advocate the use of individual voir dire. Kentucky 276 and
Texas277 guarantee criminal defendants in capital cases sequestered
voir dire. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice also advocate the
use of individual voir dire in cases involving substantial publicity. 27

7 355 S.E.2d 47 (W. Va. 1987).
2Id.

at 50, 51.

274736 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1987).

In Claybrook, the court stated:

[Whenever there is believed to be a significant possibility that a
juror has knowledge of the jury verdict at a prior trial, or has been
exposed to other potentially prejudicial material, the examination of
each juror, with respect to his exposure, shall take place outside the
presence of other chosen and prospective jurors.
Id. at 100 (quoting Sommerville v. State, 521 S.W.2d 792, 797 (Tenn. 1975)).
27S Claybrook, 736 S.W.2d at 100. Thus, had Mu'Min been tried in Tennessee, he
would have been afforded the right to question prospective jurors individually.
276 KY. R. CRiM. P. 9.38.
The rule states, in relevant part, "[wihen the
commonwealth seeks the death penalty, individual voir dire out of the presence of other
prospective jurors is required as to questions regarding capital punishment and pretrial
publicity." Id.
2
n TEX. CODE CRIM. P. Art. 35.17 (Vernon 1989). The rule states, in relevant part,
ln a capital felony case.. . on demand of the State or defendant, either is entitled to
examine each juror on voir dire individually and apart from the entire panel, and may
further question the juror on the principles propounded by the court." Id.
m ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 8-3.5(a) (2d ed. 1980).
Standard 8-3.5(a) states:
If there is a substantial possibility that individual jurors will be
ineligible to serve because of exposure to potentially prejudicial
material, the examination of each juror with respect to exposure shall
take place outside the presence of other chosen prospective jurors.
. . . The questioning shall be conducted for the purpose of

144

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. X

Despite the fact that various state and federal courts have
advocated the use of content questions and individual voir dire,
criminal defendants are apt to face more difficult standards in the
future due to the Mu'Mn decision. One state supreme court has
already used the lower standard to uphold the murder conviction of
a defendant.279 In State v. Williams,50 the defendant had been
convicted of first-degree murder and the use of a weapon to commit
a felony.2"' In his appeal, the defendant claimed that prejudicial
publicity had "prevented him from receiving a fair trial by an
impartial panel." 282 The Supreme Court of Nebraska ultimately
rejected defendant's claim, citing to the recent analysis by the
Supreme Court in Mu'Min v. Virginia.2" 3
In examining the extent of pretrial publicity in Williams, the
Nebraska court compared the extensive adverse publicity that was
evident in Mu'Min.2 ' After noting the inflammatory and prejudicial
nature of pretrial publicity in Mu'Min, including Mu'Min's previous
record, prejudicial newspaper headlines, details of the crime scene,
and Mu'Min's disciplinary record, the court concluded that the
publicity present in Williams did not approach the degree present in
Mu'Mn.285 Thus, by not finding the trial court in Mu'Min to be
confronted with a "wave of public passion" sufficient to warrant

determining what the prospectivejuror has read and heard about the
case and how any exposure has affected that person's attitude toward
the trial, not to convince the prospective juror that an inability to
cast aside any preconceptions would be a dereliction of duty.
In 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recommended the use
of the ABA standard in all future cases where there is a significant possibility that
individual jurors have been exposed to pretrial publicity. United States v. Addonizio,
451 F.2d 49, 67 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972).
2" State v. Williams, 480 N.W.2d 390 (Neb. 1992).
250 480 N.W.2d 390 (Neb. 1992).
2" Id. at 393.
Id. at 394. The pretrial publicity included an article reporting Williams' wife
entering a plea of guilty to the charge. Because the article's headline proclaimed
"Williams enters plea of guilty," Mr. Williams claimed that jurors may have believed
he had pled guilty, rather than his wife. Id. at 396.
2 Id. at 397.
P

Id.

ns Id.
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individual voir dire or content questioning, 8 6 the Supreme Court has
now narrowed the circumstances in which a criminal defendant will
be able to ask prospective jurors adequate questions to determine
impartiality.
Courts have concluded that "[tihe primary purpose of voir
dire is to make possible the empanelling of an impartial jury through
questions that permit the intelligent exercises of challenges by
287 Only by asking the potential juror what he has read or
counsel. ,,
heard about the case and what impressions he has formed can the trial
court fully determine if the juror meets the required constitutional
standard of impartiality. 28 The right to eliminate inadequate jurors
cannot be performed meaningfully or effectively unless counsel has
adequate information with which to evaluate the venire.28 9 The
Supreme Court's ruling in Mu'Min v. Virginia ignores the possibility
of prejudice and increases the chances of an unfair trial occurring
where there has been substantial pretrial publicity.

V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's ruling in Mu'Min v. Virginia2' is a
The decision seriously
grave omen for defendant's rights.
undermines a defendant's chances of obtaining an impartial jury in a
highly publicized case. A court cannot fully determine a juror's
impartiality without questioning a-prospective juror as to the content
of the media reports to which he or she has been exposed. Jurors are
now trusted to judge their own potential biases. Judges are now
given wide discretion to determine a juror's claim of impartiality.
The Mu'Min decision sets a dangerous precedent in that it
fails to insure that a defendant's guarantee to an impartial jury is
sustained. Instead of a jury deciding the case solely on evidence

Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (1991).
§ 2.05[31[c],
at 2-24, 2-25 (2d ed. 1983) (quoting United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 651 (6th
Cir. 1973)).
2 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1915 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Turner v.Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 40 (1986) (Brennan, J.,concurring).
27 NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JuRywoRK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES

o 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
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presented at trial, a defendant is now subject to claims made against
him or her in the media. Not only is a defendant now faced with the
potential of predisposition in a juror's mind, but the defendant cannot
even defend himself by ascertaining what the juror has seen or heard
through the media prior to trial.
The right to an impartial jury is a tantamount one. The
Constitution not only requires it, but justice demands it.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decision ignores the harsh reality
that not all prospective jurors will be able to judge their impartiality
adequately or truthfully. As a result, the nation is left with a judicial
system less just, less fair, and ultimately, less impartial.

William Geoffrey Kastin

